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CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL MILITARY PARK COMMISSION.

THE CAMPAIGN FOR CHATTANOOGA.

HISTORICAL SKETCH DESCRIPTIVE OF THE MODEL IN RELIEF, OF THE REGION ABOUT CHATTANOOGA, AND OF THE BATTLES ILLUSTRATED THEREON.

WASHINGTON:
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.
1902.

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
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
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TERRAIN AND BATTLES OF THE MODEL.

[Confederate forces in *italics*.]

The Model in Relief was executed by Edwin E. Howell, for the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park Commission, under the authority of Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of War, from the very elaborate topographical survey of Chattanooga and vicinity made for General Grant immediately after the battle of Chattanooga, by Gen. W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. The Chickamauga section of the model follows the minute topographical survey of that region by Everett E. Betts, C. E., Engineer of the Park.

The troop positions represented agree with such as were officially established at the time; the additions represent the results of prolonged studies by the Park Commission, acting in cooperation with twenty-six State commissions. The latter were composed, in the main, of veterans who served in the campaign for Chattanooga, every State but one (West Virginia) having troops engaged being represented by a commission, and this State having had but one regiment in the battles.

The model in relief embraces a territory 11 by 16 miles. The horizontal scale is 500 feet to the inch and the vertical an inch and a half to 500 feet. The sides of the model are north and south, east and west. Lookout Mountain is in the western section. This territory of 176 square miles includes the battlefields of Chickamauga and Chattanooga, each covering three days' operations, and the minor affairs of Wauhatchie and Brown's ferry, by which Hooker's forces from the east, with cooperating troops from Chattanooga, reopened the river line of supplies to Bridgeport.

The battle of Chickamauga, which was Rosecrans's battle for the possession of the roads to Chattanooga and the city itself, occupied three days. September 18, 1863, and the night of that day were devoted by each army to obtaining position, and involved only skirmishing, some of it heavy, at various points. The 19th and 20th were days of continuous and desperate battle.

The affairs at Wauhatchie and Brown's ferry occurred on the 27th and 28th of October. The participants were two brigades of the Twelfth Corps and two divisions of the Eleventh from Bridgeport under Hooker, and two brigades (Hazen's and Turchin's) from Chattanooga under W. F. Smith, with a sufficient detail from a third (Stanley's) to man the boats used in descending the river. The opposing Confederate force at Wauhatchie was one division of *Longstreet's* corps. At Brown's ferry were parts of two regiments of infantry and two pieces of artillery. The movement secured Lookout Valley to the Union forces, opening a short line of supplies both by road and river to the railroad at Bridgeport. The battle of Chattanooga also occupied three days. Its object was to force *Bragg* from before the city, his lines occupying Lookout Mountain, crossing the valley south of the city, and running in front of Missionary Ridge to the river above the city.

The first day—November 23—Orchard Knob and the advanced Confederate line through the plain were captured. At night Sherman crossed the Tennessee opposite the north end of Missionary Ridge. November 24 Hooker stormed Lookout Mountain and carried it and Sherman occupied the northern spurs of Missionary Ridge unopposed. November 25 Sherman, from his front, assisted by the Eleventh Corps and one division from

the Army of the Cumberland, attacked Tunnel Hill. In the afternoon Hooker reached Rossville Gap from Lookout Mountain, cooperating with the Army of the Cumberland, which at 3.15 p. m. moved with four divisions to the storming of Missionary Ridge, carrying first the rifle pits at its base and immediately after the ridge itself along a front of 3 miles, ending the battle, *Bragg* retreating first to Ringgold and the second day to Dalton.

TOPOGRAPHY OF THE TERRITORY REPRESENTED.

The Chickamauga field is in the valley of that stream. The latter within the limits of the field is deep, with precipitous banks, except at the fords. Two bridges were made available by the Confederates for crossing. The elevation of the stream above the sea is 700 feet, and that of the Tennessee at Chattanooga 634. This field was about two-thirds forest, the woods being generally thick with underbrush. The Lafayette road, which runs through the center of the field from Lee & Gordon's mill to Rossville Gap, is at Viniard's 28 feet above the Chickamauga and 80 feet at McDonald's. West of that road the field rises more rapidly into the spurs of Missionary Ridge. At the Snodgrass House and vicinity the elevations range from 200 to 250 feet above the river. The field from the river westward rises in a succession of low and chiefly wooded ridges.

Missionary Ridge has an elevation above the plain of from 286 to 500 feet. Lookout and Raccoon or Sand Mountain have a general elevation of 2,300 feet above the sea, and from 1,500 to 1,700 feet above the Tennessee River.

The main road to Chattanooga in the line of the opposing armies' movements was the State or Lafayette road, which

crosses the Chickamauga at Lee & Gordon's mill and passes through Missionary Ridge at Rossville Gap. This was the axis and prize of the battle, since it largely controlled the advance to the city.

LOCALITIES OF THE CHICKAMAUGA FIELD AND VICINITY.

The Chickamauga bounds the field on the south and east. The western boundary is the Crawfish Springs road to Macfarlands Gap. The Lafayette road runs from south to north through the center of the field, while the road from Jay's mill on the east to Brotherton's and westward divides it into nearly equal north and south areas.

Passing down the Chickamauga from Lee & Gordon's mill are the following battle localities: Hall's ford, Dalton's or Hunt's ford, Thedford's ford, Alexander's bridge, Lambert's or Byram's ford, Fowler's ford, Reed's bridge, Dyer's ford, Dyer's bridge, Daffern's ford, and Ringgold or Red House Bridge.

On the Lafayette road, going north from Lee & Gordon's to Rossville, are the following houses and fields of the same name: Scott's, Viniard's, Brotherton's, Poe's, Kelly's, McDonald's, and Cloud's.

On or near the road from Reed's bridge, by way of Brotherton's westward, are Winfrey's, Brock's, Brotherton's, and Dyer's houses and fields of the same name.

Passing north on the Crawfish Spring road are Osborn's, T. Osborn's, Cave Spring, Weathers's, Widow Glenn's, Bloody Pond, Vittetoe's, and Macfarlands Gap.

The Snodgrass House is north of Dyer's house, and the Mullis house and Savannah Church still farther north.

The horizontal scale of the model (500 feet to the inch) gives 10.56 inches to the mile.

The following table of distances by the roads will serve to fix the relative positions of prominent points on the various fields:

	Miles.
Lee & Gordon's mill to—	
Viniard's	1. 52
Brotherton's	2. 54
Kelly's	3. 50
Cloud's	4. 84
Rossville	8. 04
Chattanooga	12. 04
Lafayette	13. 90
Chattanooga to—	
Rossville	4. 00
Kelly's	8. 54
Lafayette	26. 00
Lookout Mountain	3. 00
Wauhatchie	6. 00
Macfarlands Gap	6. 77
Sherman's crossing	3. 00
Chattanooga, Fort Wood to Missionary Ridge	3. 00
Wauhatchie to Brown's ferry	4. 00
Brown's ferry to Chattanooga (across neck)	1. 50
Rossville to—	
Bragg's headquarters, Missionary Ridge	3. 80
Tunnel	7. 82
North end Missionary Ridge	8. 46
Macfarlands Gap	2. 77
McDonald's to—	
Reed's bridge	2. 50
Macfarlands Gap	2. 25
Jay's mill	2. 12
Brotherton's to Jay's mill	2. 00
Ringgold to Reed's bridge	6. 25
Alexander's bridge to—	
Jay's mill	1. 55
McDonald's	3. 15

	Miles.
Hall's ford to Jay's mill	2. 80
Snodgrass House to—	
Brotherton's	1. 30
McDonald's	1. 34
Kelly's	. 62
Cloud's	2. 74
Macfarlands Gap	2. 45
McAfees Church	3. 60
In McLemores Cove—	
Lee & Gordon's mill to—	
Crawfish Spring	1. 97
Glass's mill	4. 72
Macfarlands Gap to Crawfish Spring	6. 23
Crawfish Spring to—	
Owens	3. 00
Pond Spring	5. 00
Stevens Gap	11. 00
Doughertys Gap	19. 00
Davis Crossroads	9. 00

After the firm possession of Nashville early in 1862, and the subsequent battle of Stones River, December 31, 1862, and January 1 and 2, 1863, the objective of the Army of the Cumberland was Chattanooga. This involved, first, the forcing of the Confederate army from Middle Tennessee, and next, a campaign against Chattanooga itself.

Chickamauga was the battle for that objective.

The subsequent battle of Chattanooga, which embraced Orchard Knob, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge, defeated *Bragg's* purpose to regain possession of that city.

Chattanooga was the gateway through the Cumberland Mountains for the Union Army to the Atlantic seaboard States.

For the Confederates it was a railway center of immense importance. It occupied the intersection of nearly all their

trunk lines. Those from Richmond through East Tennessee to New Orleans there crossed the lines from Memphis to Charleston, and those from Kentucky through Tennessee and Georgia to the Southeastern seaboard. There was only one other line of communication between Richmond, Atlanta, and New Orleans.

THE MIDDLE TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN.

Marching from Murfreesboro, Triune, and Franklin on the 23d of June, 1863, General Rosecrans moved against *Bragg*, who was strongly fortified at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, his lines also occupying various gaps—Hoovers, Liberty, Bellbuckle, Guys, and others—in a range of rough, rocky hills that covered the position of his infantry, which extended from Shelbyville to Wartrace. *Bragg's* cavalry was thrown well north of Duck River, and extended from McMinnville on the east to Spring Hill on the west. *Polk's* corps was at Shelbyville; *Hardee's* headquarters was at Wartrace, and his troops held Hoovers, Liberty, and Bellbuckle gaps.

By brilliant strategy, with the loss of only 570 killed and wounded, and 13 captured and missing, the Army of the Cumberland, with its 9 divisions, consisting of 20 brigades, operating through nine days of continuous rain, maneuvered *Bragg*, with his 7 divisions, composed of 23 brigades, out of his natural and artificial strongholds, and forced him across the Tennessee. Up to that time there had been no strategic campaign to equal this, and it was soon to be far surpassed, except in the one element of loss, by the campaign to follow it. So brilliant had been the conception and the execution of his plans that all the corps commanders, headed by General Thomas, hastened to call on General Rosecrans and offer the warmest congratulations.

CAMPAIGN FOR CHATTANOOGA.

At the close of the Tullahoma campaign *Bragg* occupied Chattanooga and the mountain passes above and below it. Rosecrans's army lay along the western base of the Cumberland Mountains, its right above Winchester and its left at McMinnville. Here General Rosecrans at once began the most vigorous preparations for another campaign for the occupation of Chattanooga. Because the necessities of the case compelled secrecy as one of the main elements of success, there was soon at Washington a manifestation of unreasoning impatience over what was criticised as the inaction of the Union commander; but those who were on the ground know well the unceasing activity and energy with which the work of accumulating sufficient supplies of food, material, and ammunition progressed, preparing the means for crossing the Tennessee, and obtaining the necessary knowledge of the mountain passes, roads, and trails by which the army must move. Rosecrans's supplies reached him over a badly equipped line of worn railroad, 113 miles in length, in an enemy's country, and, as can be readily understood, when the daily wants of a great army preparing for extended movement and battle are considered, the matter of accumulating a surplus of supplies was not the task of a day or a week. With every effort the railroad was not repaired until July 25, and the forward movement began on the 14th of August.

A glance at the atlas of the Park Commission will disclose the great natural obstacles which lay between General Rosecrans and Chattanooga. As his army faced toward the latter point, the Cumberland Mountains, with a general elevation of 1,800 feet above their base, rose before it. The escarpment was every-

where precipitous, and destitute of every means of approach, except narrow mountain roads and trails, with the one exception that a short railroad ran from Cowan to Tracy City on the summit of the range. To the eastward this range dropped by like precipitous and difficult slopes into the valley of the Sequatchie River. Beyond that stream rose the equally sharp cliffs of Waldens Ridge, with a general elevation of 1,300 feet above the plain. This fell off precipitately along the eastern and southern edge of the plateau into the valley of the Tennessee, and overlooked it from the mouth of the Sequatchie River to a point far above Chattanooga. It was 50 miles as the crow flies from the lines of Rosecrans's army across this continuous mountain region to the valley of the Tennessee. This river was broad and deep, and presented in itself the most serious natural obstacle which the Union army had encountered since it left the Ohio River. It was 2,700 feet wide at Bridgeport, and 1,254 feet at Caperton, the points where bridges were subsequently thrown.

On the left bank of the river, the stronghold of Chattanooga lying behind the river, and the great ranges to the westward between Rosecrans's position and his own, might well seem to *Bragg* impregnable, in fact almost unassailable. First, looking from Chattanooga toward the west, came the Lookout range, rising abruptly from the river to the height of 1,500 feet, and stretching southwestwardly far into Georgia and Alabama. Its western precipices looked down into the narrow valley of Lookout Creek. Beyond the latter rose the equally precipitous cliffs of the Raccoon Mountain, the latter having the same general elevation as the Lookout range. The elevation of the Tennessee River at Chattanooga is 634 feet.

The gorge of the Tennessee where it breaks through these mountain ranges is so narrow and so thoroughly commanded from the heights on both sides as to render it impracticable to move an army to attack it from the front or river line.

With these giant obstacles to the progress of his columns, most serious even if they had been within the Union lines, but almost insuperable when found in an enemy's territory, and while he was bending every energy to complete preparations for carrying out a brilliant plan of his own for overcoming them, General Rosecrans received on August 4, only ten days after his railroad had been repaired to the Tennessee River, a dispatch from Halleck, saying:

> Your forces must move forward without delay. You will daily report the movement of each corps till you cross the Tennessee River.

He was then engaged in building boats, opening mountain roads, rushing the accumulation of stores, getting out material for 4,000 feet of bridges, preparing to leave his base carrying provisions for twenty-five days, and ammunition for two battles, and crossing three mountain ranges and a deep and broad river in an enemy's country, and in the face of an army.

To this dispatch General Rosecrans replied:

> Your dispatch ordering me to move forward without delay, reporting the movements of each corps till I cross the Tennessee, is received. As I have determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations and getting such information as may enable me to do so without being driven back, like Hooker, I wish to know if your order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner of moving my troops.

To this Halleck responded:

> The orders for the advance of your army, and that it be reported daily, are peremptory.

General Rosecrans immediately wrote his reply, and calling the corps commanders together, read the dispatches given above. There was no dissent from the proposition that at that stage of their preparations it was impossible to move. He then read his reply as follows, and all approved and agreed that they would support him:

General HALLECK: My arrangements for beginning a continuous movement will be completed and the execution begun Monday next. We have information to show that crossing the Tennessee between Bridgeport and Chattanooga is impracticable, but not enough to show whether we had better cross above Chattanooga and strike Cleveland, or below Bridgeport and strike in their rear. The preliminary movement of troops for the two cases are very different. It is necessary to have our means of crossing the river completed, and our supplies provided to cross 60 miles of mountains and sustain ourselves during the operations of crossing and fighting, before we move. To obey your order literally would be to push our troops into the mountains on narrow and difficult roads, destitute of pasture and forage, and short of water, where they would not be able to maneuver as exigencies may demand, and would certainly cause ultimate delay and probable disaster. If, therefore, the movement which I propose can not be regarded as obedience to your order, I respectfully request a modification of it or to be relieved from the command.

On the following day Halleck replied as follows:

I have communicated to you the wishes of the Government in plain and unequivocal terms. The objective has been stated, and you have been directed to lose no time in reaching it. The means you are to employ and the roads you are to follow are left to your own discretion. If you wish to promptly carry out the wishes of the Government you will not stop to discuss mere details. In such matters I do not interfere.

This was answered the same day by General Rosecrans as follows:

Your dispatch received. I can only repeat the assurance given before the issuance of the order. This army shall move with all dispatch com-

patible with the successful execution of our work. We are pressing everything to bring up forage for our animals. The present rolling stock of the road will barely suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have bought 50 more freight cars, which are arriving. Will advise you daily.

This was the last of interference from Washington.

Ten days later, namely, on August 16, the movement to secure Chattanooga began. A reference to the atlas will reveal its strategy.

Rosecrans had decided to cross the Tennessee in the vicinity of Bridgeport, and subsequently the Raccoon and Lookout Mountain ranges at points south of Chattanooga, and thus compel *Bragg* to evacute the place or to come out of it and fight for his line of communications. It is easily seen that if after crossing the river the enemy, warned in time, should be found in force on the western slopes of these ranges further progress in that direction would have been impossible, and a return to the north bank of the river obligatory. It was, therefore, necessary to wholly deceive *Bragg* as to the points of crossing.

Burnside was marching from Kentucky into East Tennessee. Any apparent movement of the Army of the Cumberland in force in that direction would naturally lead *Bragg* to believe that a junction of the Union forces was contemplated on his right.

Everything being ready, Crittenden opened the campaign with the Twenty-first Corps. Leaving his camps at Hillsboro, Manchester, and McMinnville on the 16th of August, he crossed the Cumberland Mountains and occupied the Sequatchie Valley from a point between Jasper and Dunlap to Pikeville. Van Cleve held the latter place, Palmer was established at Dunlap, and Wood at Anderson, between Dunlap and Jasper. All built

extensive camp fires and moved about in such ways as to convey to observers from the heights the impression that the whole army was moving. Meantime Minty's cavalry had moved through Sparta and driven *Dibrell's* cavalry eastward through Crossville, on to the Tennessee, at Kingston, and over it, and *Dibrell*, having come to reconnoiter, naturally got the idea that Rosecrans's army was coming. The crossing of the Cumberland was but the first step of the imposing diversion. Though the mountain roads were few and very difficult, Crittenden's movements over them had been completed exactly on time. The advance over Waldens Ridge, equally difficult, though it was not quite as high as the main range, was immediately undertaken. Minty, on the extreme left, appeared on the Tennessee more than 30 miles above Blythe's ferry, where he made most energetic commotion. Hazen reached the river in the vicinity of Dallas. Two brigades were strung out along the edge of the cliffs on the top of Waldens Ridge, where they overlooked Blythe's ferry, and could be seen from the other side of the river. Minty swept down the valley of the Tennessee to near Chattanooga. Wilder and Wagner also appeared in the valley. While a show of building boats was made in the small streams about Blythe's ferry, Wilder, on August 21, from the heights of Stringers Ridge, opposite Chattanooga, opened fire on the town with artillery. *Bragg* was thoroughly deceived. *Forrest* was ordered far up the Tennessee to Kingston to watch for the expected crossing. *Buckner* was ordered from East Tennessee toward Blythe's ferry.

As may be supposed, Wilder's cannonading produced the wildest excitement in Chattanooga. The rolling stock of the railroads was hastened out of reach. The depots of supplies

were moved out of the range of the unexpected bombardment. *D. H. Hill's* corps was hurried off to guard the river above, and other heavy forces were moved in the same direction. Everything done by *Bragg* was based upon the idea that Rosecrans was moving in force to points on the river above the city.

Meantime the real movement was going on quietly 60 miles by the mountain roads, in the opposite direction, beyond the Cumberland Mountains, and also in the vicinity of Bridgeport and Stevenson. A force of cavalry for the purposes of observation, and to convey the idea by quick movements that Rosecrans was feigning below, while really expecting to cross above the city, was sent as far westward as Decatur. Thus Rosecrans's front, when he reached the Tennessee River, extended from Kingston to Decatur along the river through a hundred miles of mountain region and more than a hundred of low country beyond, and in spite of the natural difficulties every part of the plan was working with precision.

Thomas and McCook on the right moved at the same time with Crittenden. Reynolds, of Thomas's corps, had marched in advance and repaired the roads by way of University and down the eastern slope of the mountain to Jasper. Brannan followed him, and both were at first kept well out of sight of the river. Baird and Negley came down nearer to Bridgeport and McCook descended back of Stevenson. With the exception of Sheridan at Bridgeport, all were kept well out of sight from the enemy's cavalry on the left bank.

Sheridan alone made a show of his presence and openly began the construction of a trestle through the shoal water in order to lessen the length of the floating bridge. As this was without a decided show of strength it deepened the impression that the

movements on this wing were the feint and those toward the upper river the real move. In fact, after watching Sheridan's trestle building for a while from the other side of the river, *Anderson's* brigade of infantry, the only infantry force available to oppose a passage of the river, was withdrawn and sent to Chattanooga.

The bridge for Caperton's ferry was brought down on a train, which was halted out of sight, and a road cut for its transportation through the woods to a point near its destination, where the troops which were to lay it were drilled in their work.

Early on the 29th of August pontoons, each carrying 30 men, were brought out of the woods near Caperton's, rushed across an open field, launched, and quickly rowed to the opposite shore. The Confederate cavalry pickets were driven off and a brigade held the south bank. The bridge was promptly laid. Davis was soon over, and then McCook's entire corps, with cavalry, started promptly for Valley Head, 40 miles down the Lookout range. Reynolds collected boats at Shellmound. Brannan had built rafts and canoes at the mouth of Battle Creek. The long bridge was successfully laid at Bridgeport, and before *Bragg* had recovered from his surprise, in fact before he had comprehended the extent of the movement, Rosecrans, with two corps, was over the river and moving toward his communications.

As soon as the crossing of McCook and Thomas was assured, Crittenden marched with celerity down the Sequatchie Valley toward the bridges and was soon across the Tennessee with the main body and advancing on the left of it directly toward Chattanooga.

This crossing of the Tennessee was a great feat. The bridges were not sufficient for the army. Reynolds gathered small boats

and improvised his own means of crossing. Brannan's men cut out canoes from immense poplars and launched them in Battle Creek out of sight. Some of them would hold 50 men. They also built rafts, one of them large enough to carry one piece of artillery. These, with an abandoned rebel pontoon boat, constituted Brannan's flotilla. When the signal was given the whole swept out from behind the bushes which concealed the mouth of Battle Creek and made for the opposite shore. The rebel pickets withdrew and the crossing was secured. Then all his men who could swim, piling their guns, clothing, and accouterments on a few fence rails, pushed these before them and thus gained the opposite bank. Later, Wilder swam his mounted brigade across the river above Chattanooga and joined Crittenden south of the city.

But this crossing, and the grand diversion which made it possible, were only the preliminary and by no means the formidable parts of the movement. To complete it, Rosecrans was to cut loose from his base, carry twenty-five days' supplies and sufficient ammunition for two battles, cross two precipitous and difficult mountain ranges wholly within the enemy's territory, by widely separated roads, these being the only trails practicable for wheels, and their passes presumably strengthened and defended, and, after crossing the last range at widely separated points, to descend into the valley in the rear of the enemy's stronghold, and be prepared for battle or any other contingencies which might arise on this distant and isolated theater of action.

When *Bragg* discovered the real point of crossing and the lines of actual movement it was too late to recall the forces dispatched up the Tennessee or to post columns of sufficient strength on the slopes before Rosecrans to impede his advance

in force. How strong the positions thus turned by the Union forces were will appear from the statement that so precipitous and otherwise difficult were the roads over these ranges that at several of them it required a day and a night for a division with its artillery and reduced trains to make the ascent, and equal time for the descent.

The Union commander had delayed his movement until the corn was ripe, in order that it might not be necessary to carry grain for his animals, which would have largely increased his trains—so careful and thoughtful was he in every detail of preparation.

Bragg's failure to resist in the vicinity of Rosecrans's crossings and at the crossings of Raccoon Mountain was due in part to the fact that even after he knew that the heads of columns were over the river he was still inclined to look upon their movements as a feint, and to regard the real point of danger to be above the city. Rosecrans, even after crossing, sought successfully to strengthen such impressions in *Bragg's* mind. He directed Wagner's, Wilder's, and Minty's brigades to report to Hazen, and with this force, some 7,000 strong, the latter was ordered to make a conspicuous show of crossing the river far above Chattanooga. This active and efficient officer admirably executed his orders. By extended fires along Waldens Ridge, by marchings and countermarchings, by moving his artillery continuously across openings in sight from the opposite bank, by buglers at widely separated points, and other similar devices, he easily created the belief that an army was encamped on the right bank intending to cross.

With the exception of this force, all of Rosecrans's army was south of the river on September 4, and on the move. The right

was already well on its way. On the 6th his army had descended from Raccoon Mountain and occupied the valley between that range and the western slope of Lookout from a point 7 miles from Chattanooga to Valley Head, 42 miles from the city. The next day McCook and Thomas began to ascend Lookout at points respectively 42 and 26 miles from Chattanooga. On the 8th McCook's troops were in motion down the eastern slope of the mountain toward Alpine, and Thomas was descending through Stevens and Fricks gaps. Crittenden, from near Wauhatchie, had pushed small portions of his command up mere mountain trails, and on the 9th these gained position where they could look down upon Chattanooga. They saw no flags, and soon discovered that *Bragg* had evacuated the city. The day before, Wagner, still watching from the north bank of the river, had reported to Rosecrans that the enemy was leaving. The news came in the night, and Rosecrans ordered Crittenden to ascertain the situation. His detachments on the mountain had already discovered that the city was deserted. Crittenden was at once ordered to march around the north point of Lookout, and follow *Bragg* toward Ringgold. At night of the 9th Palmer's and Van Cleve's divisions were established at Rossville, 5 miles south of Chattanooga, Woods following on the 10th.

Thus, in three weeks from the time his diversion toward *Bragg's* right began, and in five days from the time his army was over the river, Rosecrans had repeated the Tullahoma campaign on a far greater scale, and in the face of much more formidable obstacles, and absolutely without fighting, except as Minty had been slightly engaged with *Dibrell* near Sparta in the outset of the movement, had forced *Bragg* from the mountain stronghold of Chattanooga, the objective of the campaign.

General Meigs, who came from Washington to Chattanooga after its final occupation by the Union army, and spent some days in studying the movements by which it had been secured, said:

> It is not only the greatest operation in our war, but a great thing when compared with any war.

But the occupation of Chattanooga, in a military sense, was not accomplished by leaving one brigade in it. *Bragg* had only withdrawn to save his communications and supplies, to confront the Union army as it descended the Lookout range, and to await the reenforcements he knew to be hastening from Virginia, from Mobile, and from Mississippi. The battle for Chattanooga was yet to be fought. *Bragg* had retired with deliberation. He established his headquarters at Lafayette, behind Pigeon Mountain, but his rear guard never passed far beyond Lee & Gordon's mill.

The news as published in the North that Rosecrans's troops were in Chattanooga, and that he had pushed out after the retreating *Bragg* made a tremendous impression there. It was accepted as a capture and a military occupation of that long-coveted stronghold. It is true it was occupied, but not in a military sense, since the Union army had not been brought into it or concentrated between it and the enemy. It was not even a temporary depot of supplies. The rations, forage, and ammunition of the army were in the trains of the several corps. The nearest was 13 miles distant and the others 30 to 50 miles distant by the roads it was necessary for them to follow.

The belief that Chattanooga had been occupied in force caused misconception, which was widespread, that the Army of the Cumberland had occupied Chattanooga in force, and, march-

ing out to attack *Bragg*, had been defeated by the latter at Chickamauga, and driven back in disorder into Chattanooga.

But, instead, Chickamauga was the battle for Chattanooga, fought by Rosecrans while on the way to take possession of it in force, and while he was concentrating his army between *Bragg* and that city, the objective of the Union campaign. The battle was not for the Chickamauga woods, but for. the passes behind them which controlled the way to Chattanooga. These were secured as the immediate results of the battle, and the successful occupation of Chattanooga in the military sense followed—an occupation which lasted till the close of the war.

The Army of the Cumberland, except as Crittenden had observed it from Lookout Mountain, and left one brigade in it, had not even seen Chattanooga until the second day after the battle of Chickamauga.

In connection with the fact of Crittenden's unopposed movement into Chattanooga, another point of general misapprehension arose, which, through the years, has formed a basis for criticism of General Rosecrans's brilliant strategy. Why did not Rosecrans face Thomas and McCook about in the valley west of Lookout, where their movements would have been concealed, and hurry them after Crittenden into Chattanooga?

Rosecrans replied that it was simply because with McCook's advance nearly 50 miles from Chattanooga by the roads west of Lookout, and Thomas's head of column over Lookout and Missionary Ridge, full 25 miles away, to attempt to withdraw them over the mountains in full view of the enemy would have left *Bragg* free to fall with his whole force upon Crittenden and crush him before either McCook or Thomas could recross Lookout and reach him. In such a plan for concentration the chances would have been in

favor of *Bragg's* success. Besides, the shortest and surest, in fact the only practicable, line of concentration looking to the safety of the widely-separated corps was through a movement to the left along the eastern bases of Lookout and Missionary Ridge.

After the army had crossed Lookout the dispatches from the right were to the effect that *Bragg* was retreating on Rome. At the same time General Halleck telegraphed from Washington that it was reported there that a part of *Bragg's* army was reenforcing *Lee*, and that it was important to ascertain the truth of the report as soon as possible. General Rosecrans thereupon ordered pursuit. Any other course, previous to ascertaining that *Bragg* was not retreating, would have been open to criticism. Thomas, who was ordered forward to Lafayette, soon found the enemy in strong force in the gaps of Pigeon Mountain and throughout McLemores Cove.

Rosecrans also quickly discovered that *Bragg's* right was held near Lee & Gordons mill in contact with Crittenden, that *Longstreet* was about to reenforce him, and that *Bragg* was evidently concentrating for battle.

Turning from projected pursuit, every energy was exerted to concentrate the army and hold it between *Bragg* and Chattanooga. On the 17th of September McCook had reached Thomas, and Thomas moved toward Crittenden. It was this movement of Rosecrans for concentrating on Crittenden's position near Lee & Gordon's that led to the battle of Chickamauga. *Bragg*, having been heavily reenforced, started at the same time from Lafayette to interpose between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, the Union objective of the whole campaign.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES.

The Union Army, Gen. W. S. Rosecrans, was composed of the following corps and divisions of the Army of the Cumberland:

Fourteenth Corps, Gen. George H. Thomas.
Divisions—Baird, Negley, Brannan, Reynolds.
Twentieth Corps, Gen. A. McD. McCook.
Divisions—Davis, Johnson, Sheridan.
Twenty-first Corps, Gen. T. L. Crittenden.
Divisions—Wood, Palmer. Van Cleve.
Reserve Corps, Gen. Gordon Granger.
Divisions—Steedman, D. McCook's brigade of Morgan's.
Cavalry Corps, Gen. R. B. Mitchell.
Divisions—E. McCook, Crook.

The Confederate Army, Gen. Braxton Bragg, was composed as follows:

Buckner's corps, Gen. S. B. Buckner.
Divisions—Stewart, Preston.
Hill's corps, Gen. D. H. Hill.
Divisions—Cleburne, Breckinridge.
Longstreet's (Hood's) corps, Gen. James Longstreet.
Divisions—McLaws, Hood, Bushrod Johnson.
Polk's corps, Gen. Leonidas Polk.
Divisions—Cheatham, Hindman.
Walker's (reserve) corps, Gen. W. H. T. Walker.
Divisions—Walker (Gist), Liddell.
Forrest's corps (cavalry), Gen. Nathan B. Forrest.
Divisions—Armstrong, Pegram.
Wheeler's corps (cavalry), Gen. Joseph Wheeler.
Divisions—Wharton, Martin.

PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS, SEPTEMBER 18.

Both armies moved toward the Chickamauga field from the southwest, *Bragg* from east of Pigeon Mountain and down the Chickamauga Valley toward its fords and bridges, and Rosecrans from McLemores Cove, which lies between Lookout and Pigeon mountains (see map) by way of Crawfish Spring.

During September 18 the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, with the cavalry on their right and front toward the Chickamauga and two divisions of the Twenty-first Corps on the left, were concentrating in McLemores Cove, the Fourteenth in the vicinity of Pond Spring and the Twentieth in front of Stevens Gap, and cautiously moving to the left toward the right division of Crittenden's corps, his left division (Wood) being in position at Lee & Gordon's mill. Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry was at Alexander's bridge and Minty's brigade of cavalry east of Reed's bridge observing the road thence to Ringgold.

Gordon Granger's troops were at McAfees Church with forces thrown forward toward the Chickamauga, observing the road from that point to Ringgold.

BRAGG'S ORDER FOR BATTLE.

On the night of September 17 *Bragg* issued his orders for battle. *Hood's* corps was to march early on the 18th from Ringgold, cross at Reed's bridge, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Crittenden's position, the left of the Union Army at Lee & Gordon's mill. *Polk's* corps was to demonstrate in front of this latter position, and, if found practicable, cross and attack. *Walker's* corps was to cross at Alexander's bridge and join

Hood in the movement toward Crittenden. *Buckner's* corps was to cross at Dalton's ford and join the general movement.

Thus *Bragg's* plan of battle was to gain the Lafayette road between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, drive Crittenden back on the Union center in McLemores Cove, and the whole into the mountains from which the center and right had emerged.

At 8 o'clock on the morning of September 19 *Bragg's* plan had progressed to the formation of his lines of battle, with the left resting on the high ground near Hall's ford and facing the left of Crittenden's line at Scott's, north of Lee & Gordon's, the distance between the lines being only 1,000 yards.

This concentration of *Bragg* for battle had been thus accomplished: *Bushrod Johnson*, in command of his own and such portions of *Hood's* (*McLaw's*) division as had arrived at Ringgold, marched from that place early on the 18th to force a crossing at Reed's bridge. Upon reaching Pea Vine Creek, east of Pea Vine Ridge, about 11 o'clock, he was compelled by Minty's cavalry to deploy his lines, and was thereafter so vigorously opposed that he was not able to cross the river until 3.30 p. m. Meantime, Wilder, at Alexander's, had prevented the crossing of *Walker's* corps, dismantled the bridge, thus obliging it to proceed to Lambert's ford, a mile and a half below, where it crossed toward evening and during the night. *Hood* arrived at Jay's mill at 4 p. m., took command, and moved to the high ground east of Viniard's, Minty and Wilder falling back before him, and, assisted by Dick's brigade of Van Cleve's division, holding him in check at that point.

During the night of the 18th and early morning of the 19th *Buckner's* corps crossed the river at Dalton's and Thedford's fords. Preston's division formed on the left and *Stewart's* on

the right, both in column of brigades. *Walker's* two divisions were moving up from the direction of Lambert's ford to the support of *Hood's* line on the right, and *Cheatham's* division of five brigades was taking position as the reserve of the left. *Hindman's* division was still east of the Chickamauga, opposite Lee & Gordon's, and *Hill's* corps was opposite Glass's mill. *Wheeler's* corps of cavalry was operating at that point and still farther up the stream. *Forrest* had been sent at an early hour with three brigades from Alexander's bridge to the vicinity of Jay's mill, a part of one brigade proceeding to Ringgold Bridge, to guard the right and rear of *Bragg's* lines against any movement from the direction of McAfees Church.

At 8 o'clock artillery firing was in progress between a Confederate battery near Hall's ford and a Union battery on Crittenden's line at Scott's. The orders for attack were being delivered along *Bragg's* line when desultory firing, which began about 7.30, became continuous toward Jay's mill, several miles to the right and rear, and suspended the intended forward movement until its meaning could be ascertained. Very soon a report came from *Forrest* of a heavy attack upon him, and calls for infantry. He had already found *Wilson's* and *Ector's* brigades and taken them to his lines, and at *Forrest's* request *Walker's* remaining division (*Liddell's*) was hurried to the ground of unexpected fighting.

This unforeseen attack upon *Forrest's* force at Jay's mill resulted from a night march of Rosecrans's troops in McLemores Cove to interpose between *Bragg* and Chattanooga. Starting from the vicinity of Pond Spring late in the afternoon of the 18th, the Fourteenth Corps, followed later by the Twentieth, marched by way of Crawfish Spring and Widow Glenn's and

arrived at Kelly's soon after daylight. Without waiting for breakfast Brannan's division was sent north to McDonald's, where it turned east toward Jay's mill. At 7.30 Croxton's brigade became severely engaged on the slope just west of the mill, and at 8 o'clock Van Derveer's brigade struck the enemy to the left of Croxton and both were continuously and heavily engaged for nearly five hours. Connell's brigade came to their support, and its battery rendered vital service. *Forrest*, reenforced by *Walker's* and *Liddell's* divisions, appeared on the flank of Croxton and caused him to move by his right flank. An attempt by *Forrest* to turn Van Derveer's left failed in disastrous repulse. Van Derveer by rapid movement facing his brigade about, wheeling it by the rear rank, and rushing two batteries to the crest north of him, there met *Forrest*, charging dismounted in four ranks, and overwhelmed him. This ended the fighting for the day on that portion of the line.

Croxton, hard pressed by *Wilson's* brigade of *Walker's* division, was relieved by the advance of Baird from Kelly's. Baird, in succession, was taken in flank and thrown into much confusion by the arrival of *Liddell's* division dispatched by Bragg from his reserves. *Walthall*, of this division, captured the battery of J. H. King's brigade of regulars, dispersing the brigade; and *Govan* captured the battery of Scribner's brigade, and forced Starkweather's brigade to the rear. King's battery was soon after recaptured by the Ninth Ohio, charging from the right of Van Derveer's line.

Liddell's troops were, in turn, taken in flank by the advance of Johnson's division of McCook's corps from near Poe's on the Lafayette road, and obliged to retreat in confusion to avoid capture.

By noon *Bragg's* plan of battle was entirely destroyed, and his divisions, as well as those of the fast-arriving Union columns, were being hurried in succession to the new field of battle forced on him by the night march of Rosecrans's army, which had thrust the Union lines far beyond *Bragg's* position and between it and Chattanooga, giving Rosecrans possession of the Lafayette road, which was the main and direct route to Chattanooga.

Following *Walker's* divisions, *Bragg* dispatched *Cheatham's* four brigades from his reserve to the right. *Cheatham* first struck Johnson north of the road from Brotherton's to Jay's mill and east of Brock's. After two hours' fighting *Cheatham*, assisted by a small force of *Forrest's* cavalry, was forced back to the high ground south of Winfrey's, and Johnson advanced his line to that house. Johnson had been assisted on his right by Palmer's division sent to Thomas by Crittenden from the vicinity of Lee & Gordon's. This division formed at Poe's, on the Lafayette road, and advanced to Brock's in échelon by brigades, striking a portion of *Cheatham's* line and becoming heavily engaged.

Two brigades of Van Cleve's division followed Palmer from Crittenden's position, formed at Brotherton's, and pushed eastward into the forest on the right of Palmer. One of these (S. Beatty's) captured the battery of the left brigade (*Wright's*) of *Cheatham's* division, and repulsed the brigade.

At this juncture *Stewart's* division, detached from *Bragg's* original line, arrived in front of Van Cleve and Palmer, both of these divisions having been reenforced by troops of Reynolds's division, Turchin's brigade assisting Palmer and E. King's brigade joining Van Cleve.

At 4 p. m. *Stewart's* division had driven Dick's and S. Beatty's brigades of Van Cleve's division, and two regiments of King's brigade, across the Lafayette road south of Brotherton's, and assisted by *Bushrod Johnson's* division, which had crossed the Lafayette road south of Brotherton's, Van Cleve was pushed still farther west and retired beyond the Crawfish Spring road. *Bate's* brigade penetrated the Union line at Poe's, and *Clayton's* brigade at Brotherton's. *Bate* was soon repulsed by the fire of 20 guns and supporting infantry hastily assembled by Reynolds in the north end of the Poe field. The arrival in the Dyer field of Brannan's division from the left, and Negley's from the extreme right, quickly restored the Union center.

From noon to sundown a fierce engagement was in progress in the Viniard fields. Just before noon Davis's division of McCook's corps, following Johnson, arrived at Rosecrans's headquarters at Widow Glenn's, and was sent eastward to Viniard's with orders to develop the Confederate left. Carlin's brigade moved directly east from a point south of Widow Glenn's, crossed the Lafayette road and entered the Viniard fields, Wilder's brigade being in line west of the road along the western edge of the fields. Heg's brigade of Davis's division moved to the left of Widow Glenn's, crossed the Lafayette road and moved southeastwardly through the forest until its advance was stopped by *Bushrod Johnson's* troops in position on the first ridge east of Viniard's. *Johnson's* and *Hood's* divisions, with *Trigg's* brigade of *Preston's* division, then advanced upon the Union forces, and fierce fighting followed, with alternate advances across the Lafayette road and repulses. Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve, which had been left near Lee & Gordon's, came early to the assistance of Carlin. At 4 p. m. Harker's and Buell's brigades of

Wood's division arrived from Lee & Gordon's, followed a little later by Bradley's and Laiboldt's brigades of Sheridan. There were then seven brigades engaged on each side. Harker passed beyond Viniard's and with his right became engaged east of the Lafayette road to the left of Trigg, while two of his regiments crossed to the west side and attacked *Bushrod Johnson's* left from the rear and dispersed it as it was attacking the right of Van Cleve's line in the south end of the Brotherton field.

The fighting at Viniard's ended by the Confederates withdrawing at sundown to the forest east of Viniard's. Only a portion of these movements are shown on the model for want of room.

At sundown fighting had ceased on every part of the field. Rosecrans held the Lafayette road, and his lines were solidly between *Bragg* and Chattanooga.

General Thomas had selected a new line, skirting the eastern edge of the Kelly field, nearer the Lafayette road, and as Johnson with Baird on his left was about to withdraw to it a fierce attack was opened in the dusk upon their lines. *Cleburne's* division had been brought from the other side of the Chickamauga and formed along the road from Alexander's bridge to Jay's mill, with his right resting at the mill. Supported by two brigades of *Cheatham*, he fell upon Johnson and Baird and a desperate fight ensued in the darkness, lasting over an hour, when the Union divisions slowly withdrew from under fire to their new positions at the Kelly field. The arrows in front of *Cleburne* and Johnson indicate the theater of this night attack.

During the night the lines of each army were rearranged.

THE SECOND DAY AT CHICKAMAUGA.

Sunday morning, September 20, the lines of the two armies were arranged as follows:

Baird's division extended around the northeast corner of the Kelly field, his left refused. Skirting this field on the east, next came the divisions of Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, the right brigade of the latter being in échelon west of the Lafayette road, its right reaching the Poe field. Brannan's front covered the Poe field at its western edge. Next came Negley along the western line of the Brotherton field. Major-General Thomas was in command of the whole of this line. During the night the Union right at Viniard's and Lee & Gordon's had been brought to the high ground west of the Crawfish Spring road. Wilder's brigade was the right of this line west and south of Widow Glenn's; part of Sheridan's division was next on the left. Then in succession came Davis, Wood, and Van Cleve, the latter reaching to Vittetoe's. At an early hour Davis was moved forward to the right of Negley, and Sheridan was established in front of Widow Glenn's.

At 8 o'clock Negley was ordered from the right of Thomas's line to the extreme left, where that officer was attempting to strengthen it against a flank attack. Wood, with Barnes's brigade of Van Cleve's division, was moved forward to relieve Negley, and after considerable delay occupied the line he vacated. The Union front was protected around the Kelly field by a line of logs and such stumps and stones as could be gathered. The rest of the line was rudely protected by rails and such material as could be hastily gathered. There were no rifle pits.

The Confederate line was wholly east of the Lafayette road, its right and center being in close contact with the Union line. Beginning on the right of its infantry, *Breckinridge's* division confronted Baird, two brigades and a half of his line extending beyond Baird's left. Two divisions of *Forrest's* cavalry, one operating dismounted, still further prolonged the Confederate line. *Cleburne's* division was on the left of *Breckinridge*, then in succession on the front line came *Stewart*, *Bushrod Johnson*, *Hindman*, and *Preston*, the whole of the latter division extending beyond the Union right.

Walker's corps of two divisions was in reserve in rear of *Breckinridge*, *Cheatham* with five brigades in rear of *Cleburne* and *Stewart*, and *Law's* and *Kershaw's* divisions were in column just in rear of *Johnson's* line in front of Brotherton's, but the latter two are omitted from the model to avoid crowding.

The Union line was therefore overlapped by infantry on both flanks, and the Confederates had five divisions of infantry in reserve, and two divisions of cavalry between its right and Gordon Granger's three brigades at McAfee's Church.

Bragg had eleven brigades of infantry which were not engaged the first day, while Rosecrans had but six, counting Granger. *Bragg* had fifteen brigades of infantry as reserves, while Rosecrans had only Wilder's brigade in rear of Widow Glenn's, and two brigades of Van Cleve near Vittetoe's, and all of these were sent immediately to the front line when the battle opened in their vicinity.

Longstreet had arrived in person during the night. He was placed in command of the left wing, and *Polk* was assigned to the right wing.

Bragg had ordered a general attack at daylight to begin on his right, to be taken up by divisions in succession to the left. A heavy fog and other causes delayed *Breckinridge's* forward movement until after 9 o'clock. In advancing, his left brigade (*Helm's*) struck Baird's left, protected by log works, and was shattered, *Helm* being mortally wounded; the right of the brigade gained the Lafayette road. The other brigades of *Breckinridge's* division reached the Lafayette road, drove back J. Beatty of Negley, wheeled to the south and entered the Kelly field and the woods west of it, full in Baird's rear. Here he was met and repulsed by the brigades of Stanley, Van Derveer, and Willich, the reserves of Negley, Brannan, and Johnson, respectively.

Cleburne and *Stewart* next assaulted and were repulsed. *Cleburne* made a second assault with the same result. *Walker's* divisions attacked Baird at noon and were badly broken. The assaults on this line continued vigorous but unsuccessful till after 2 p. m. General *Bragg* ordered a combined assault for 3 o'clock, but the lines could not be reorganized in time to deliver it until 6 o'clock, when Reynolds and Palmer had already been withdrawn, and Johnson and Baird had been ordered to follow.

At 11.15 *Longstreet* moved his center in front of Brotherton's forward, his three divisions of *Johnson*, *Law*, and *Kershaw*, the latter two not shown on the model, in column, its center having a depth of five brigades. At that moment Wood's division was being moved to the left and had partially gained the rear of Brannan, when *Johnson's* division, the head of *Longstreet's* column, forced its way into and through the opening. While Davis was attempting to close the gap left by Wood, Sheridan was also rushed from Widow Glenn's to the left, and while

moving both were attacked by *Hindman* in front, while the flanks of both were assailed, Sheridan's by *Hindman*, and Davis's by *Johnson*. These two Union divisions, thus broken off, were forced over the high ground to the west and off the field. Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden were caught in this break of the right and went to Chattanooga. This left General Thomas in command on the field. Wilder, from the heights beyond Widow Glenn's, had charged the left of *Hindman* and driven it east of the Lafayette road. He had then moved westward into Chattanooga Valley. Davis returned to the field at sundown. Sheridan moved through McFarlands Gap to Rossville, and thence marched toward Thomas, reaching Clouds at dark, returning by Thomas's order to Rossville later. Parts of Negley, Van Cleve, and Wood were thrown into confusion by the break at the center and left the field in much disorder.

Stanley's brigade rallied at the Snodgrass House, Brannan withdrew his line to that position. Harker's Brigade, of Wood, returned to the Dyer field, threw his line in front of *Longstreet's* column then moving toward Snodgrass hill, repulsed *Law's* division, delayed *Kershaw's* following it, and finally took position on Stanley's left at the Snodgrass House.

The four divisions around the Kelly field stood fast. Soon after 1 o'clock *Longstreet* began his assaults on Snodgrass hill with *Kershaw's*, *Hindman's*, and *Johnson's* divisions. About 2 o'clock the Confederates had passed over the hill to Brannan's right and gained the valley in his rear. At that moment Steedman's division (Whitaker's and Mitchell's brigades) under Gordon Granger, arrived from McAfees Church, drove the enemy from Brannan's rear and right, carried the ridge, and extended Brannan's right three-fourths of a mile to the heights over-

looking Vittetoe's. Van Derveer's brigade arrived immediately after from the Kelly field and strengthened Brannan's right, and Hazen's brigade was brought from Palmer's line at the Kelly field and took position on Harker's left.

The Kelly field line, with its four divisions, formed Thomas's left, the Snodgrass hill line, with five brigades and some fragments of regiments, his right. Dan McCook's brigade had been left by Granger on the heights northwest of and overlooking Baird's left. On his way from McAfees Church to Snodgrass hill, Steedman had retaken the Union hospital at Cloud's Spring, which had been captured about noon by *Forrest's* cavalry.

Longstreet had eleven brigades for his assaults on Snodgrass hill. These continued without intermission until sundown. At 3 o'clock *Longstreet* had asked Bragg "for some troops of the right wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no service to me." (See *Longstreet's* report.)

Snodgrass hill was not carried, and the battle ended at that position at dusk.

Toward sunset *Bragg* had so far succeeded in his plan of battle as to command the Lafayette road beyond the left of the Union Army, *Liddell's* division (*Govan's and Walthall's* brigades) having advanced to it at McDonald's. General Thomas, under earlier orders from General Rosecrans, and in order to reestablish his lines between *Bragg* and Chattanooga, then decided to withdraw his army through Macfarland's Gap to Rossville, and there confront *Bragg* with a new line.

This was accomplished in good order, except that Johnson's and Baird's divisions, being attacked at the time of withdrawing, were thrown into considerable confusion, but order was restored after reaching the forest west of their positions.

Upon reaching Rossville the Union Army was established in Rossville Gap, upon Missionary Ridge on each side of it, and across the valley to Lookout Mountain. It remained in this position between *Bragg* and Chattanooga throughout September 21, and during the night withdrew unmolested to the city.

Bragg followed on the 22d, and ordered a general attack on the city for the morning of the 23d. Slight skirmishing developed the fact that Rosecrans's lines were well intrenched and too strong for attack. *Bragg* therefore formed his lines about the city from the river at the foot of Lookout Mountain to the river above the city, possessed himself of the point of Lookout Mountain and Lookout Valley, and thus of the river line of supplies, and sat down to starve out his enemy.

OPERATIONS ABOUT CHATTANOOGA.

Chattanooga speedily became a formidable fortified camp. For a few days Rosecrans held Lookout Mountain, but withdrew from it because it would require an extension of his right for 3 miles to hold it, and this line would have been "in air." Besides, to retain it would not have saved the river line of supplies, since *Bragg* would simply have needed to establish a force on any point below overlooking the river.

Both armies were reorganized after reaching Chattanooga. The Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps of the Union Army were consolidated into the Fourth, McCook and Crittenden being relieved, and Gordon Granger assigned the new command. The Reserve Corps was incorporated in the Fourteenth Corps.

The divisions of the Fourth Corps were Palmer, Sheridan, and Wood. Those of the Fourteenth were Johnson, Davis, and Baird.

Bragg's infantry comprised three corps—*Breckinridge's* and *Hardee's* each of four divisions, and *Longstreet's* of two. *Breckinridge's* divisions were *Stewart*, *Bate*, *B. Johnson*, and *Hindman* (*Anderson*). *Hardee's* divisions were *Cheatham*, *Cleburne*, *Stevenson*, and *Walker*. *Longstreet's* divisions were *McLaw's* and *Hood's*. His corps held Lookout Valley, the mountain, and the line east of it to Chattanooga Creek, until after the battle of Wauhatchie, when on November 4 his corps was dispatched to Knoxville.

Neither army retained its cavalry at Chattanooga, except that Long's brigade remained with Rosecrans.

The Union Army was supplied by a wagon haul of 60 miles over mountain roads from Bridgeport. Heavy rains in October made it extremely difficult to supply the army, and for a time the troops were on half rations or less.

Soon after the battle of Chickamauga the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, under the command of Hooker, were sent from the Army of the Potomac, reaching Bridgeport September 30.

General Rosecrans had devised a plan for reopening the river line of supplies by seizing Brown's ferry from Chattanooga, and bringing Hooker forward into Lookout Valley. The execution of the plan waited the completion of boats for the necessary bridge, and when they were ready *Wheeler's* raid north of the river caused still further delay. Orders for the movement were given on October 19, General Rosecrans on that day selecting the point for throwing the bridge. On returning to headquarters he found orders relieving him and putting General Thomas in command. The latter, as his first order, repeated Rosecrans's instructions to Hooker to prepare to come forward into Lookout Valley.

General Grant arrived October 23, and at once approved the plan and ordered it executed. Hooker was ordered from Bridgeport to Lookout Valley, and the command of the cooperating force from Chattanooga, which was to seize Brown's ferry and throw a bridge there to afford communication with the valley, was given to Gen. W. F. Smith and brilliantly executed.

BROWN'S FERRY AFFAIR.

On the night of October 26 parts of Hazen's and Turchin's brigades were marched across the neck of Moccasin Point and concealed near Brown's ferry. At 3 a. m. of the 27th fifty pontoon boats, each carrying thirty armed men, left the landing at Chattanooga and were floated quietly in the shadow of the willows lining the right bank of the river to Brown's ferry, where the leading boats landed on the left bank, the soldiers rushing into the gorge and ascending the ridge on each side of it, and accomplishing the seizure of the position, which was held by parts of two regiments of *Law's* brigade with a section of artillery. A pontoon bridge was immediately thrown, and the remainder of Hazen's and Turchin's brigades crossed to the new position.

Hooker, with the two divisions of the Eleventh Corps—Schurz and Steinwehr—and Geary's of the Twelfth, marched from Bridgeport the morning of October 27, entered Lookout Valley the afternoon of the 28th, the Eleventh Corps proceeding to a junction with Smith at Brown's ferry, while Geary's division went into biouvac near Wauhatchie covering the road to Kelly's ferry.

At midnight *Jenkins's* division (of *Longstreet*) attacked Geary, the battle continuing three hours. The Eleventh Corps, march-

ing to the relief of Geary, attacked *Jenkins's* supports, and *Longstreet's* force withdrew over Lookout, leaving Lookout Valley and the short line of supplies in Union control.

The Union Army was then rapidly refitted, and to attack *Bragg* Grant only awaited the arrival of Sherman, who had been ordered from Vicksburg with four divisions immediately after Chickamauga.

November 21 Sherman had arrived, and by November 23 three of his divisions were in camp behind the hills which were opposite the north end of Missionary Ridge.

GRANT'S PLAN OF BATTLE.

The attack on *Bragg's* position, which had been ordered for the 21st, was delayed by waiting for Sherman, who was kept back by wretched roads. It opened on the 23d, though not according to plan. Under Grant's announced plan Hooker was to hold Lookout Valley with Geary's division and Cruft's of the Fourth Corps. The Eleventh Corps was to be brought into Chattanooga on the 22d to cooperate either with Sherman or Thomas. Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at the mouth of the Chickamauga the night of the 23d, surprise and carry Missionary Ridge as far south as the Tunnel, this position not being then occupied by the enemy. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, was to move to the left as soon as Sherman was astride the ridge, connect with Sherman's right, both then to sweep up the valley, crowding *Bragg* from his depot at Chickamauga Station, Tennessee, his communications, and his positions on the ridge.

CAPTURE OF ORCHARD KNOB.

The battle departed widely from this plan. On Nov. 23 Grant, hearing that *Bragg* was withdrawing, directed Thomas to drive in his pickets and ascertain if he was still occupying his camps. Taking Wood's division and supporting it with Sheridan and Baird on the right, and Schurz and Steinwehr on the left, he charged forward from Fort Wood, captured Orchard Knob and the line on the low ridge south of it, which together constituted the enemy's advanced position in front of Missionary Ridge. This line was held. During the attack on Orchard Knob *Walker's* division was dispatched from its position in the lines at the east foot of Lookout and sent to a position on Missionary Ridge about a mile south of the Tunnel. At night Sherman crossed the Tennessee unmolested.

November 24, General Thomas having obtained permission from General Grant for Hooker to make a demonstration against Lookout Mountain, Hooker stormed it with Geary's and Cruft's divisions and Osterhaus's, which had been prevented from joining Sherman by the breaking of the Brown's ferry bridge.

STORMING OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN.

Stevenson was in command on Lookout Mountain. Six brigades were available for its defense. Only two, with three regiments of a third, were actively engaged, the brunt of the fighting being really borne by one, *Walthall's*, which was posted on the western slope of the mountain below the palisades, while *Moore's* brigade was on the eastern slope.

Hooker moved from Wauhatchie early in the morning of November 24, crossed Lookout Creek at Light's mill, with

Geary's division, supported by Whitaker's brigade of Cruft's division, and, concealed by the fog, marched by the flank up the mountain until his line reached the palisades. Then, facing toward the point of the mountain after a march of nearly two miles, he struck the flank of *Walthall's* brigade. As his lines approached the point, first the other brigades of Cruft's division joined Hooker's left, and then Osterhaus's two brigades, and together they swept around the mountain, forcing *Walthall* back of the Cravens House, where he was joined by *Moore's* brigade and three regiments of *Pettus's* brigade from the summit. This position was held until about 3 a. m. of the 25th, when, the troops on the top of the mountain having been withdrawn, the force below the palisades confronting Hooker also descended into the plain and crossed to Missionary Ridge. No Union troops gained the summit of Lookout during the battle. During the night the whole Confederate force in the valley was withdrawn to its crest, except as skirmishers were left in the rifle pits at the base of the ridge. Except as Walker's division had been ordered toward the north end of Missionary Ridge on the 23d, this was the first infantry occupation of the crest of the ridge.

SHERMAN'S CROSSING AND ADVANCE.

Before daylight of the 24th Sherman had 8,000 men in line on the south bank of the river facing the north of Missionary Ridge. At that time and until 2.30 in the afternoon the nearest Confederate troops were about a mile south of the Tunnel. At 1 o'clock Sherman moved forward and without encountering any enemy established his lines, about 4 p. m., on the spurs north of Tunnel Hill. General Howard joined him early in the day with Buschbeck's brigade.

THE STORMING OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.

At 7 o'clock on the 25th of November Sherman, with three of his own divisions, supported by Davis, from the Army of the Cumberland, and the two of the Eleventh Corps, began his attack on Tunnel Hill. This was defended by *Cleburne's* and *Stevenson's* divisions. Sherman's attack continued until near 4 p. m., but was unsuccessful.

At 3.15 p. m. four divisions of the Army of the Cumberland moved from the Orchard Knob line to assault Missionary Ridge. Baird was on the left, Wood next, then Sheridan, and Johnson on the right. The signal for starting was six guns from Orchard Knob. The line had a front of 2½ miles. Each division was in double line, and some of the brigades in four. The left and right divisions started with the understanding that they were to assault the ridge. There was some confusion of orders at the center, which caused part of the line to halt after carrying the rifle pits at the base of the ridge. This, however, caused brief delay, and all the divisions seemed to reach the crest simultaneously. *Cheatham's* division formed across the ridge north of Baird's left, and prevented the Union troops which had reached the summit from gaining ground to the left. This enabled all troops confronting Sherman, together with the divisions of *Cheatham* and *Walker*, to retire unmolested.

Hooker left Lookout Mountain at 10 a. m. for Rossville Gap, but owing to the destruction of the bridge over Lookout Creek he did not reach Rossville until 3 p. m. Osterhaus then pushed through the gap, dispersing part of *Clayton's* brigade, and, turning north along the eastern base of Missionary Ridge, captured many prisoners from *Stewart's* division, which, at the same

time, was under attack from Cruft, who assaulted and carried the point of the ridge north of the gap, and Geary, who assaulted from the west, and reached the crest soon after and south of the right flank of General Thomas's lines. The Army of the Cumberland in this assault captured 37 field guns and 2,000 prisoners. *Bragg* retreated through Chickamauga Station, Tennessee, and Ringgold to Dalton, Hooker in pursuit, having a severe engagement at Ringgold Gap.

It is difficult to make a close estimate of the opposing forces at Chickamauga. The best estimate with all information now available seems to be that which places the Union forces in action at 55,000 and *Bragg's* at 70,000 as a minimum.

General Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee with an effective force of all arms equipped for duty of a few hundred more than 60,000. Of this number Wagner's brigade, with 2,061 effectives, was at Chattanooga, leaving the Union force in front of *Bragg* slightly less than 58,000. It was several thousand less at the battle, Post's brigade of Davis's division and three regiments of infantry and one battery, in all, six regiments and two batteries, being engaged in guarding supply trains.

In a letter from General *Lee* to President *Davis*, dated September 14, 1863, the following figures of *Bragg's* actual and prospective strength are thus stated:

> If the report sent to me by General *Cooper* since my return from Richmond is correct, General *Bragg* had, on the 20th of August last, 51,101 effective men; General *Buckner*, 16,118. He was to receive from General *Johnson* 9,000. His total force will, therefore, be 76,219, as large a number as I presume he can operate with. This is independent of the local troops, which, you may recollect, he reported as exceeding his expectations.

It will be well to remember, in connection with these official figures, that *Bragg*, after the battle, reported *Longstreet's* force, which was not included by *Lee*, 5,000. This, according to the figures furnished General *Lee*, gave *Bragg* 81,219. According to General *Johnson's* correspondence, after he had sent 9,000 to *Bragg*, he subsequently dispatched him two small brigades, and these reached him the day before the battle.

At the time the battle was fully joined on the second day the entire Union infantry force was on the firing line, and there were no reserves. At the same time the Union left was overlapped by two brigades of infantry, *Breckinridge's*, and two divisions of cavalry, *Forrest's*, one of these operating as infantry. The Union right was overlapped by an entire infantry division, *Preston's*. *Walker's* corps of two divisions (*Liddell's* and *Gist's*) were the reserve of *Bragg's* right wing, and *Cheatham's* division of five brigades the reserve of his right center. In addition, at the center *Law* and *Kershaw* in column of divisions formed a reserve for *Bushrod Johnson*, who was on the first line.

As both Union and Confederate lines were continuous, and as the locations of all divisions on the ground are now known, it is clear that whatever the actual figures for either side may have been, *Bragg's* forces largely outnumbered those of Rosecrans.

The casualties of each army were 33 per cent of those engaged.

The long-accepted version of Sunday's break on Rosecrans's right was that the two corps of Crittenden and McCook were swept off the field; but only five brigades of McCook's entire corps left the field, and the fragments which went from Crittenden would not exceed two brigades. Palmer's and Johnson's divisions, which fought splendidly to the end under

Thomas on the left, were respectively from Crittenden's and McCook's corps. Harker's brigade of Wood's division belonged to Crittenden. Barnes's brigade, which fought on the extreme left, and part of Dick's and Samuel Beatty's were all of Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps. In other words, the larger part of Crittenden's force fought to the last. Of the Fourteenth Corps (Thomas), four regiments of Wilder's brigade of Reynolds's division were detached and cut off with the right, and a considerable part of Negley's division went to the rear, chiefly through the mismanagement of its commander. Stanley's brigade, and part of Sirwell's, of Negley, were with Thomas to the last. The battle of Sunday was not the fight of any one corps, but of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no disorderly retreat of the army on Chattanooga, and nothing approaching it.

The greater portion of the right wing, which was cut off and certainly thrown into much confusion, was reorganized at Rossville, and occupied its place in line at that point throughout the next day and until the army moved on in the night to occupy Chattanooga. The battle was desperate from the moment it opened till its close. For the most part the lines fought at close range, and, in the countless assaults, often hand to hand. On the first day there were no fieldworks of any kind. On the second Thomas was protected by such rude log works as could be hastily thrown together. Brannan and Steedman were without a semblance of works. The battle in the main, on both sides, was dogged, stand-up fighting far within the limit of point-blank range. For the second day, on the Confederate side, the contest was one continued series of brave assaults.

A single comparison will bring out the magnitude of the

operations of Rosecrans and *Bragg*, and also the deadliness of the fighting.

The Army of the Cumberland, at Chickamauga, had only two less infantry regiments than the Army of the Potomac in the Seven Days' battles, and *Bragg* had only three less than the *Army of Northern Virginia* in those battles, a total difference for the combined armies of only five regiments of infantry. The reported losses of Rosecrans at Chickamauga in two days were 16,179, and of McClellan in the Seven Days' battles only 15,849, or 330 less than Rosecrans; of *Bragg*, in two days, 17,804; of *Lee*, in Seven Days' battles, 19,749. Rosecrans's missing, notwithstanding the long-current exaggerations of the disaster to his right, were only 4,774, against 6,053 in the Seven Days' battles. The total losses of both sides in the Seven Days' battles were only 1,615 more than Rosecrans's and *Bragg's* for the two days at Chickamauga. In this comparison, however, it should be remembered that the regiments of 1862 were numerically stronger than those of 1863.

FORCES AT CHATTANOOGA.

Bragg, after the departure of *Longstreet* and two brigades of *Buckner's* division, had about 40,000 men for his firing line. Grant had about 60,000. *Bragg's* dominating positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge much more than compensated by military rules for his disparity in numbers.

Of the Union force, Hooker had a few less than 10,000 in the battle of Lookout Mountain. Thomas's assaulting line at the center numbered about 22,000. Sherman had about 28,000 about the north end of Missionary Ridge.

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